European Journal of Political Economy

Issue: 23, 1

http://www.elsevier.com/homepage/sae/econworld/econbase/poleco/frame.htm

Editorial

• Central bank transparency and central bank communication: Editorial introduction  1 - 8
  Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W.
  de Haan, Jakob
  Rybinski, Krzysztof

Special papers

• The value of central bank transparency when agents are learning  9 - 29
  Berardi, Michele
  Duffy, John
• Central Bank forecasts and disclosure policy: Why it pays to be optimistic  30 - 50
  Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W.
  Tesfaselassie, Mewael F.
• The impact of central bank transparency on inflation expectations  51 - 66
  Demertzis, Maria
  van der Cruijsen, Carin
• Central bank transparency and credibility: The case of Poland, 1998–2004  67 - 87
  Lyziak, Tomasz
  Mackiewicz, Joanna
  Stanislawska, Ewa
• Strong goal independence and inflation targets  88 - 105
  Baltensperger, Ernst
  Fischer, Andreas M.
  Jordan, Thomas J.
• Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?  106 - 123
  Blinder, Alan S.
• The timing of central bank communication  124 - 145
  Ehrmann, Michael
  Fratzscher, Marcel
• On the consistency and effectiveness of central bank communication: Evidence from the ECB  146 - 175
  Rosa, Carlo
  Verga, Giovanni
• Quest for central bank communication: Does it pay to be “talkative”?  176 - 206
  Rybinski, Krzysztof
  Rozkrut, Marek
  Sztaba, Lucyna
  Szwaja, Radoslaw
• Do financial markets react to Bank of England communication?  207 - 227
  Reeves, Rachel
  Sawicki, Michael
• The advantage of showing your hand selectively in foreign exchange interventions  228 - 244
  Barnett, Richard C.
  Ozerturk, Saltuk
• Were verbal efforts to support the euro effective? A high-frequency analysis of ECB statements  245 - 259
  de Haan, Jakob
  Jansen, David-Jan