Global Fellows Forum, Spring 2004


Activities of the Hauser Global Law School Program

Global Fellows Forum, Spring 2004

Joint Emile Noel Fellows and Global Fellows Forum

Yigal Mersel

 
 

Forum Paper Title: How Patriotic Can the Opposition Be? The Role of the Minority Party During National Crises (full text )*

Abstract of Forum Paper:

The American legislative respond to the 9/11 tragedy - better known as the Patriot Act - was characterized by an interesting phenomenon: it passed by a very large majority in the US House of Representatives and by a nearly unanimous vote in the Senate. Similarly overwhelming support was manifested in other democracies, too, which enacted legislation or otherwise handled a national crisis. Not only has the majority party voted for these laws and governmental plans, but also the minority party or the "opposition 1" has supported them.

This phenomenon of opposition loyalty raises a question: How patriotic can the opposition be? Why have a minority party in the first place, if it can be loyal to the majority and fail to object in such crucial matters as national security and foreign relations? On the other hand, it seems obvious that an opposition need not always oppose, but rather has discretion to choose its strategies and the issues on which it will disagree. Furthermore, we do expect that in some circumstances, political disputes will be put aside in favor of other crucial interests. There is an inherent tension, therefore, in the concept of political opposition.

The question of opposition loyalty in times of crises is, thus, a good case study for a larger inquiry into the constitutional status of the opposition. Indeed, opposition research is not very developed even in political science, as the focus is usually aimed at the electoral winners and power holders rather then those who came in second-place. Jurisprudence on this topic is even rarer, as the internal functioning of the legislature is often perceived as a political matter which is not subject to legal regulation. Americans are even more reluctant to broach the issue, as it is often argued that "There is no opposition in the United States". It seems, however, that the constitutional status of the opposition is an unavoidable issue. Some countries grant the opposition rights and duties in their laws and constitutions. Others regulate the status of the opposition in their parliamentary manual or customs. Constitutional courts, mainly in Europe, are sometimes asked to rule on the rights and duties of opposition parties. Against this background, I will present the paper draft on the role of the opposition in times of crises.

The main aims of the paper presented are to explore the justifications, functions, limitations and characteristics of oppositions, while applying these to the special circumstances of national crises. Tackling the problem of party loyalty during national crises will be used as a basis for the larger issue of framing the constitutional status of the opposition. More specifically, the paper addresses the following issues:

First, I will elaborate on the concept of opposition, the historical development of the concept and the theoretical justifications for its existence. Second, I will explore the different types of oppositions, while taking into account the characteristics of parliamentary regimes versus presidential regimes. The argument in this context would be that opposition exists not only in parliamentary regimes but also in the American type of presidential regime. Third, having understood the functions, types and justifications for oppositions, I will ask, what are the limits on oppositional activity? I will refer to three possible limitations on oppositions - the duty to respect democracy, the constructiveness of the opposition and its responsibility. Fourth, I will focus on the problem of opposition loyalty and analyze the reasons for such loyalty and its outcomes, especially in times of crises.

Fifth, I will present my main argument regarding opposition loyalty, especially in times of crises. I will claim that the opposition has a duty to oppose unconstitutional violations by the majority. In other words, even if we have a reasonable expectation that oppositions will be loyal to the majority, there are times, especially during national crises, when this loyalty cannot overcome the basic obligation of the opposition to respect the rule of law and the constitution. Therefore, if the majority proposes a law which is allegedly unconstitutional, the opposition has a duty to oppose it. This argument is based on theoretical as well as practical reasons. Hence, because of the special role of the opposition in democracy, and because of the tendency, in times of crises, for judicial review to be ineffective and for minority views not to be well-represented politically, the opposition has a constitutional duty to oppose unconstitutional acts of the majority.

1. For reasons elaborated in the paper, I am using the term opposition or minority party only in the context of internal legislature's interaction, i.e. the opposition as manifested within the legislature itself by the minority party. I do not analyze other types of extra-parliamentary opposition movements and activities.

Biography

 
 

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Last updated on September 9th, 2004

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